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I. INTRODUCTION
Kierkegaard's wish might be regarded as a prescient view of a new
European legal emphasis on persons with disabilities as human subjects rather
than as objects, persons who have the potential and the possibilities to contri-
bute to marketplace productivity. For lawyers representing clients engaging in
business in Europe, particularly clients actually establishing European branches,
keeping current on work setting discrimination laws is critical. Two major
European Commission (EC) Directives announced in 2000 fundamentally
expanded anti-discrimination protections for workers.
The first, the so-called Race Directive,' is the broader of the two in one
respect, since it applies across the spectrum. That is, its provisions address not
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1. Council Directive 2000/43, art. 3(1), 2000 O.J. (L 180).
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only employment discrimination, but also discrimination in other areas, such as
housing, transportation, and education.
The second, the Framework Directive,2 although limited to employment
law, protects workers from discrimination based upon religion or belief,
disability, age, and/or sexual orientation.3 The year 2003 was the European
Year of the Disabled, probably a direct response to this second mandate from
the EC. Unarguably, revisions to workplace discrimination laws for persons
with disabilities are now on the agenda of domestic legislation in all European
Union countries.
This article focuses on developments in the area of discrimination on the
ground of disability. It is not a discourse on the Americans with Disabilities
Act; reference is made to that statute only in a comparative sense. The EC has
looked to the American statute as a beginning point, and its relevance when
analyzing the responses to the directive cannot be over-estimated.
II. SOME EUROPEAN LAW BASICS
There is frequent confusion among Americans with regard to the terms
"European Communities" or EC (originally "European Community") and
"European Union" (EU). Some legal professionals wrongly believe the EC to
be defunct and the EU to be the only correct term. "European Union" is the
goal pronounced in the Single Europe Act of 1987, but the European Com-
munity is the collective body with law-making powers. Thus, one might speak
of "EU law," designating law applicable to those countries in the European
Union, or "EC law," the more official term that refers to the actual source of
law. The EU, then, is a geographical entity, whereas, "EC" is the reference to
the body with law-making powers.
European law takes either of two forms: the regulation; or the directive.
A regulation is a primary source of law and is directly effective in all EU
member states, without any need for domestic legislation. The directive, on the
other hand, is a mandate from the EC that states an intended result. The means
by which each member state attains this result via the enactment of domestic
law is left to the individual member state. The directive has no counterpart in
American law. As a practical matter, the directive has been the more frequently
used form, particularly with regard to law relating to the establishment of a
single market.4
Currently, the adoption of a European Constitution is a topic of consider-
able controversy, although passage of the draft was actually anticipated for early
2. Council Directive 2000/78, art. 3, 2000 O.J. (L 303) [hereinafter Framework Directive].
3. Prior European Commission Directives have prohibited discrimination based on sex. See, e.g.,
Council Directive 76/207, 1976 O.J. (L 39).
4. RALPH G. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN UNION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 35 (3rd ed. 1999).
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2004. The purpose of the 1999 Cologne Council was to draft a Charter and
Constitution, and the dilemma of how a country once admitted to the EU might
later withdraw has finally been addressed in Article 59, Title IX, of the draft.
This Charter is incorporated into the proposed constitution as Part II of that
document.
Two lingering points of dissension remain: First, the proposed revamping
of voting weights;5 and second, the insistence of countries such as Ireland and
Italy that the document contain a reference to the Christian foundation of the
European Union.
A revised version was published in June 2004, shortly before the six-month
term of Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Bertie Ahem as President of the EU
expired. Thus, a European constitution is still in the "wait-and-see" stages.
The fifteen member states prior to May 1, 2004, were Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Germany, France, and Italy (the charter members at the
adoption of the Treaty of Paris in 1952); Denmark, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom (added in 1973); Greece (1981); Portugal and Spain (1986); and
Austria, Finland, and Sweden (1995). As of May 1,2004, ten new countries are
now members of the EU: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (the Baltic states); the
Czech Republic and Slovakia (the former Czechoslovakia); Slovenia (part of
former Yugoslavia); Hungary, Poland, Malta, and Cyprus. Romania has been
approved for member status, and Bulgaria and Turkey are hopefuls. The sheer
size of the EU should be viewed as an entity with which any transnational
business must be prepared to reckon.
The original European Community (the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity) became the European Communities at the adoption of the 1957 Treaty
of Rome, which created the European Economic Community and the European
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). 6 Subsequent treaties include the
Single European Act of 1987, the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European
Union) of 1992, the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, and the Treaty of Nice of
2000.
Interestingly, the conceptual purpose of the EC was to create a geogra-
phical entity comprised of signatory member countries for economic consis-
tency and harmonization. Indeed, the goal of the Treaty of Rome was to extend
the Europa-wide communal regulation of the coal and steel industries effectu-
ated by the earlier Treaty of Paris to European economy as a whole. This
5. Currently, votes from those member states with the largest population, such as Germany, France,
and Italy, are more heavily weighted than are those from the less populated states, and this lessening of power
has not been acceptable to the larger members. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (providing the objective and goal of establishing a common European
market).
6. The latter was actually added via a separate treaty executed simultaneously with the Treaty of
Rome.
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economic basis has undergone a metamorphosis, or at the least, an augmenta-
tion. In recent years (particularly since the Amsterdam Treaty), an additional
aim of the EC has been human rights. The European Convention of Human
Rights has been incorporated into EC law; all fifteen of the pre-2004 enlarge-
ment member states have enacted the terms of that Convention into their
domestic laws. Professor Gerard Quinn of the law faculty at National Univer-
sity of Ireland Galway has called this human rights direction a "pragmatic goal
of interlinking the national economics into a common market so that armed
conflict in [post-World War II] Europe was unthinkable and energies were
instead diverted into peaceful economic competition."7 He has termed this a
recognition of the premise that "naked power is dangerous and requiring
taming" and an effort to "convert the [European] Union into more than just an
engine for economic growth and integration. ' This human rights orientation
has much significance for employment law, especially employment discrimina-
tion law.
Indeed, in 1969 the European Court of Justice held that European
Communities law incorporated through its "general principles" doctrine those
fundamental rights modeled on constitutions and common law of member
states.9 Five years later, in Nold Kohlen- und Baustoffsgrosshandung v. Com-
mission, ' the Court extended this view to include in the same general principles
international treaties and the European Convention of Human Rights."
The principal organs of the EC are the European Commission (the true
law-making body located in Brussels), 2 the Council of Ministers (Brussels), the
Parliament (Strasbourg), and the European Court of Justice (Luxembourg). The
function of the first three is legislative. It is somewhat of an anomaly to the
American jurist that, although only in the United Kingdom and Ireland among
member nations is the common law system used, applying the doctrine of
precedent (other members are civil law countries), the European Court of Justice
functions under common law principles.
7. Professor Gerard Quinn, Remarks at the National Forum on Europe, National University of
Ireland Galway (Jan. 21, 2004).
8. Id. Arguably, this linkage of market economics and human values has also been used on many
occasions by the U.S. Congress under its powers under the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. cl. 3.
One prime example is the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1990) (citing
the Commerce Clause as one of Congress' sources of power in this legislation).
9. Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm - Sozialamt, 1969 E.C.R. 419.
10. Case 4/73, J. Nold v. Comm'n of the European Union, 1974 E.C.R. 491.
11. The author is grateful to Laurence Pech of the Law faculty at NUI Galway for assistance in
locating these sources.
12. The Commission is currently comprised of two members each from these five larger member
states, and one each for other member states.
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III. EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
This post-World War 11 (1950) treaty 13 created a legislative body, the
Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), both
located in Strasbourg, France. The forty original signatory countries later
adopted the 1961 European Social Charter, 14 which expanded the ECHR's
power into the areas of health and safety (including that in the workplace),
education and vocational training, protection of children and adolescents, and
right to social security.
The significance of the EC's official incorporation of the ECHR into
European law by approval of the Amsterdam Treaty in 199715 cannot be over-
emphasized. Additionally, in 2003, Ireland became the last member state in the
EU to have enacted the ECHR into domestic law. Such domestic statutes are
significant in that they empower the courts of each country to hear and
determine charges of breach. This inclusion in domestic law not only negates
the necessity for the charging party to travel to the ECHR court in Strasbourg,
but also subjects employers to an additional possible forum in which it must
respond to alleged breaches of these laws.
IV. THE FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE AND RIGHTS FOR THE DISABLED WORKER
The deadline for compliance with this directive for each country was
December 2, 2003,16 but few, if any, have satisfactorily implemented its provi-
sions. Failure to comply with a directive or regulation is a violation of EC law
for which the Commission might bring the member state before the Court in
Luxembourg. Nonetheless, the Commission has proved to be a patient parent,
so no sanctions have been imposed. Indeed, Article 28, Paragraph 2 of the
directive expressly provided for an extension of up to three years for compliance
with provisions addressing disability and age, and most member states have
taken advantage of this grace period.
The directive addresses the "need to take appropriate action for the social
and economic integration of elderly and disabled people."' 7 Although "person
13. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 19, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
14. See KNUT IPSEN & VOLKER EPPING, VOLKERRECHT 698 (C.H. Beck ed., 4d ed. 1999) for a
discussion of the underlying principles of this agreement, which encompasses workers' health and safety,
working conditions, vocational training, protection or children and adolescents, and rights to social security.
15. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1
(1997).
16. Framework Directive, supra note 2, art. 18.
17. Id. art. 6. The Framework Directive has been referred to as the "Article 13 Directive," in
reference to the anti-discrimination provision in the Treaty of Amsterdam.
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with a disability" is not defined, much of the language in the directive is drawn
from the Americans with Disabilities Act.' 8 The ADA's "reasonable accom-
modation" provision" is mirrored by the directive's call for the "provision of
measures to accommodate the needs of disabled people at the workplace" and
the "obligation to provide reasonable accommodation for people with dis-
abilities., 20 The ADA's "undue hardship" 2 ' defense is reflected by the direc-
tive's assurance that an employer need not assume a "disproportionate burden
' 22
in its accommodation for an applicant or worker's disability. The Framework
Directive takes into account costs, organizational resources and possibility of
public finding to make any necessary accommodation, and the ADA's "undue
hardship" section lists these same factors.23
Typical for EC directives, the language is broad rather than particularized,
leaving the specifics of implementation to the parliaments of each member state.
The method of tracking members' progress in implementation is through a panel
of experts, equal in number of member states, with each country having a
designated expert in the area of disability law. This panel was created by way
of a bidding process, with legal academic institutions' submission of proposals
to chair and form the panel. The law faculty at National University of Ireland
Galway prevailed, and its current dean, Professor Gerard Quinn, is chair of the
panel. After its proposal was selected, Professor Quinn and his assisting faculty
from the Galway law faculty then selected the persons to represent each member
state.24
Currently, there are similar panels on the grounds of gender, sexual
orientation, and religion, but none on age. Traditionally, EU member states
have not adopted statutory protections against age discrimination. One excep-
tion has been Ireland, which has legislation quite different from the United
States' Age Discrimination in Employment Act25 in which protection is afforded
to those aged forty and older, and there is no general maximum age for its
coverage. Ireland's 1998 Employment Discrimination Act is a comprehensive
statute that covers workplace discrimination on nine grounds, including age.
The age protection provisions in the Irish statute begin protection at age
18. Framework Directive, supra note 2, at pmbl. 6.
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9); Framework Directive, supra note 2, at pmbl. 16.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).
22. Framework Directive, supra note 2, art. 2.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1211 1(10)(A)-(B); Framework Directive, supra note 2, at pmbl. 21.
24. The author is grateful to Shivaun Quinlivan, Lecturer in Law at NUI Galway, for this
explanation. Ms. Quinlivan, who has considerable expertise in the area of disability law, is a member of the
group that drafted the proposal selected by the EU to assemble the monitoring panel and a panel participant.
25. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.
eighteen and end at age sixty-five.26 Thus, current EC plans are to disband
existing panels and replace them with a "super-panel" that will address
compliance on all grounds.
The disability panel's most recent meeting was held on November 14,
2003, in Brussels. Until reports from that conference have not yet been filed,
particulars will not be available to the general public. However, as an invited
guest at this session, the author is permitted to convey general information to
serve as some guidance to the American lawyer with business clients who must
adhere to domestic laws implementing the Framework Directive.
In general, European disability law experts have aspired to approval of a
model of the American statutes addressing legislation for the disabled from a
civil rights perspective, contrary to the typical European welfare approach.27
Generally, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam is credited with requiring that the
issue of improving opportunities for persons with disabilities be addressed from
a human rights, rather than a social law, perspective. The traditional American
approach has been advocated for non-discrimination European mandates in
general.28 Moreover, at the panel's November 2003, meeting, comments clearly
indicated that the experts viewed the ADA as a model statute. This was
primarily because legislation vested protected persons with enforceable rights,
as had the earlier Civil Rights Act of 1964, particularly, Title VII, with its pro-
visions relevant to the employment setting.29 Notably, one of the invited
speakers at the November 2003, meeting was Robert Bergdorf, an American
legal academic who had participated in the drafting of the ADA.
A. Pre-Framework Directive Domestic Legislation
The panel of expert's most recently published report was its Baseline Study
of March 2003.3o One tangent of the EU plan that is common to the United
States Congress' approach is the remedial nature of proposed legislation,
stressing rights of the individual's merit, rather than following the prior social-
medical model based on a "handout" or compensation approach.
26. Employment Equality Act, No. 21, 1998, § (6)(3)(a)-(b) (Ir.).
27. See, e.g., Gesetz zur Bekmpfung der Arbeitslosigkeit Schwerbehinderter (SchwbBAG) (Law
Fighting Unemployment of the Handicapped], v. 29 Sept. 2003 (BGB1. I S. 1394) (F.R.G) (imposing a civil
penalty on a company for its failure to meet a statutory quota of workers who are disabled).
28. See, e.g., BOB HEPPLE, The Principles ofEqual Treatment in Article 119 EC and the Possibilities
for Reform, in THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL TREATMENT IN EC LAW 137-52 (Alan Dashwood & Siofra O'Leary
eds., Sweet & Maxwell 1997).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2004).
30. EU NETWORK OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION, BASELINE STUDY,
SYNTHESIS REPORT, DRAFT #4 (March, 2003) fhereinafter BASELINE STUDY].
2004] Rasnic
112 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 11:105
Contrary to the United States, three EU countries, Austria,3 Germany,32
and Finland,33 have constitutional provisions that address protections for the
disabled. Additionally, several European constitutions insure general social
rights without specifying disadvantaged groups.34
As of 2003, five of the then fifteen EU countries had enacted civil legisla-
tion for disabled persons in the employment setting: Belgium,3 5 Germany,36
Ireland,37 Sweden, 38 and the United Kingdom.39 The Austrian Federal Legisla-
ture had considered a bill on Equal Treatment of People with Disabilities, but
it was rejected on second reading in July 2000. This bill was reintroduced on
November 1999; it has not passed the committee stage.4" Portugal's 1989 Basic
Law on Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Integration of People with Disabilities
Law4 is not regarded as anti-discrimination legislation because of the absence
of rights conferred on individuals. Rather, violators are subject to civil penal-
ties. The Netherlands' Bill on Equal Treatment on the Ground of Disability and
Chronic Disease42 has been introduced into the Dutch parliament, but has not
been enacted. Belgium's Legislature has taken the approach of deferring to the
major collective bargaining agreement. A collective agreement which evolved
31. BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [Constitution] art. 7(1) (Aus.).
32. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 3 (3) (F.R.G.).
33. SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI [Constitution] ch. 2 § 6(2) (1999) (Fin.).
34. See, e.g., CosTrruzloNE [Constitution] art. 3 (2) (1947) (Italy); CONSTITUI¢AO [Constitution]
art. 71 (1997) (Port.); STATUUT NED. [Constitution] ch. 1 art. 22 (2000) (Neth.). Similarly, article 21,
subsections 2 and 3, of the Greek Constitution insure that the state will "care for" disabled veterans.
SYNTAGMA (S TNTAGMA) [Constitution] art. 21(2), (3) (2001) (Greece).
35. Convention Collective de Travail No. 38 du 6 Decembre 1983 Concernant le Recrutement et
]a Selection de Travailleurs [Collective Agreement No. 38 of December 6, 1983 Concerning the Recruitment
and the Selection of Workers], ch. 3 (BeIg.) [hereinafter Collective Agreement].
36. Schwerbehindertengesetz (SchwbG) [Law Concerning the Handicapped], v. 9 June 2001 (BGBI.
I S. 1046) (F.R.G.), most recently amended by Gesetz zur Bekampfung der Arbeitslosigkeit Schwerbehinderter
(SchwbBAG) [Law Fighting Unemployment of the Handicapped],art. 3, v. 29 Sept. 2003 (BGBI.I S. 1394)
(F.R.G).
37. Employment Equality Act, supra note 26.
38. Lag om F6rbud mot Diskriminering i Arbetslivet p Grund av Personer Med Funktionshinder
[Prohibition of Discrimination in Working Life of People with Disabilities Act], art. 132 (SFS 1999) (Swed.);
Lag om Handikappombudsmannen [The Disability Ombudsman Act], art. 749 (SFS 1994) (Swed.).
39. Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, c. 50 (Eng.).
40. Gleichstellungsgesetz [EQUAL TREATMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABrLIEs] has been proposed
to amendthe law Behinderteneinstellungsgesetz (BeinstG) [Law Concerning the Employment of Handicapped
Workers], art. 2 § 8A (1969) (Aus.).
41. Lei Fundamental para a Prevenoo e Para a ReabilitagAo e Integrago das Pessoas com uma
Inaptidlo [Basic Law for the Prevention and for the Rehabilitation and Integration of People with a Disability],
Law No. 9/89 of May 2, 1989, (Port.).
42. Wet gelijke behandeling op ground van handicap of chronische ziekte [The Netherlands' Bill
on Equal Treatment on the Ground of Disability and Chronic Disease] (Neth.) (proposed) [herein-
after Disability & Chronic Disease Equal Treatment Bill].
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into statutory status 43 prohibits workplace discrimination, a manner often used
in Europe's smaller countries."
Different from the American approach is the enactment by several EU
states of criminal laws prohibiting discrimination on the ground of disability.
Finland,45 France,46 Luxembourg,47 and Spain48 are examples of this method.
It is submitted that the higher burden of proof, the absence of remedial measures
for the person who has sustained a loss, and the effect only upon intentional
discrimination would limit any utility of this approach.
Italian law does permit an employer to request governmental reimburse-
ment for costs incurred in making "adjustments," or "accommodations," for a
worker's disability.49 In Luxembourg, a judicial decision rather than statutory
law requires that a business make those alterations or accommodations which,
in a physician's opinion, are necessary for an individual to perform the duties
of a position.0 Dutch law imposes on an employer a duty to provide "reason-
able accommodations" unless it would result in a "disproportionate burden,"'"
a clause similar, but not identical, to the ADA's undue hardship" provision. The
Netherlands' "disproportionate burden" appears to weigh the interests of the
disabled worker against the monetary cost to the employer, while the "undue
hardship" concept imposes a significant burden of proof on the employer to
show that its hardship would be an "undue," or inequitable, one without regard
to the degree of the worker's disability.
Austria, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and
Spain are several European countries that have comprehensive anti-discrimina-
tion legislation, but some do not expressly include disability among the
43. Collective Agreement, supra note 35.
44. A comment about Belgium's unique legal structure is instructive: Although smaller than the
American state of South Carolina, Belgium has two official languages, French and Dutch/Flemish, and four
distinct governmental regions, each with a different official language: Brussels (French and Dutch/Flemish),
Flanders (Dutch/Flemish), Wallonia (French), and eastern Belgium (German). B-2 WORLD BOOK
ENCYCLOPEDIA 227 (2003). Since much legislative authority is subordinated to the regional level, it will be
necessary for the federal law-making body in Belgium to enact a comprehensive statute in order to comply
with the Framework Directive. Baseline Study, supra note 30, at 28-31.
45. RIKOSLAKI [PENAL CODE] ch. 11, 9 § Syrjintal (578/1995) (Fin.). This is a criminal provision
for discrimination in general, with the underlying assumption that this includes the ground of disability. See
id.
46. CODE PtNAL [C. PtN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 225-1 (Fr).
47. CODE PtNAL [PENAL CODE] arts. 454, 455, 456, 457(l)-(2), (Lux.).
48. C6DIGO PENAL [C.P.] [PENAL CODE] (Spain).
49. Note that there is no positive obligation on the part of the employer to provide such
accommodation. See Baseline Study, supra note 30, at 53.
50. Loi du 12 novembre 1991 sur les travailleurs handicaps [Law of Nov. 12, 1991 on handicapped
workers], Recueil de Legislation Memorial A, Nov. 18, 1991, N' 76, p. 1444 (Lux.).
51. Disability & Chronic Disease Equal Treatment Bill, supra note 42, art. 2.
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prohibited grounds. This is the current status in Austria, 2 Finland,53 France,
54
Greece,"5 Italy, 6 the Netherlands, 7 and Spain. 8 Denmark has a Disability
Ombudsman, 9 but no statutory provision prohibiting discrimination on the
ground of disability.
B. Panel of Expert's Areas of Focus
The panel is focusing on three areas and how they intersect: 1) the
"reasonable accommodation" requirement, the express working of the ADA; 2)
pre-employment physical examinations, also addressed in the ADA;60 and, 3)
health and safety.6' The inclusion of this third area into anti-workplace
discrimination law is typical in Europe, contrary to the United States' separation
of such accident and/or disease preventive legislation into statutes such as the
Occupational Safety and Health Act.62
The Irish experience with the "reasonable accommodation" expectation is
of interest. The bill that preceded the current anti-discrimination law (the 1998
Employment Equality Act) was a 1996 bill. In parliamentary forms of govern-
ment, the prime minister is a member of the legislature. In order to become law,
after passage by the law-making body, a bill must be signed by the president,
in the case of Ireland or monarch, in the case of Denmark, Luxembourg,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Then President Mary Robinson, a former
barrister, had misgivings about the constitutionality of this provision of the bill
as possibly infringing upon employers' property rights in Articles 40.3.2 and 43.
In her referral action to the Supreme Court of Ireland, the Court agreed.63
Consequently, the bill ultimately adopted into law in 1998 requires the employer
52. See, e.g., BIJNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [Constitution) art. 7(1) (Aus.); see also
GLEICHSTELLUNGSGESETZ, supra note 40, and accompanying text (explaining Austria's general working rights
statute).
53. EsiintyA Model after sama Kesken NaisvAki ja Ihmiset [Act on Equality Between Women and
Men] (8.8.1986/609) (Fin.).
54. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] art. 122-45 (Fr.).
55. ASTIKOS KODIX (ASTIKOS KODIX) [CIVIL CODE] §§ 281/188 & 666 (Greece).
56. See COSTITUZIONE [Constitution] art. 3, § 2 (1947).
57. Algemeine Wet Geliijke Behandeling [General Equal Treatment Act] (1.9.94) (Neth.).
58. Estatuto de los Trabajadores [Spanish Statute on Workers' Rights, Royal Legislative Decree]
(B.O.E., 1995).
59. Deense Arbeidsongeschiktheid Politiek Geijke Behandelingen Door de Dialoog [Danish
Disability Policy Equal Opportunities through Dialogue] (April 2002) (Den.).
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(d)(3)(A)-(B).
61. Email from Olivier de Schutter, panel expert, Belgium, to panel participants (November 13,
2003) (on file with author).
62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678.
63. In the Matter of Article 26 of the Constitution and in the Matter of the Employment Equality
Bill 1996, [1997] 2 I.R. 321 (Ir. S.C.).
to bear only a "nominal cost." 64 Note the distinction in this regard between
current Irish law and the ADA. Although the United States Supreme Court has
determined that the Title VII65 requirement for an employer to make "reasonable
accommodation" for a worker's religious practices and/or belief reaches on the
least extent necessary, i.e., de minimus, 66 the United States Congress expressly
rejected this lower standard when it enacted the ADA.67 This peculiarity in Irish
statutory law must change in order to comply with the Framework Directive, so
the necessary accommodation for a worker's or job applicant's disability will
approximate that required under the ADA.
Olivier De Schutter, the Belgian panel expert, is the overseer of researching
domestic laws that might address mandatory pre-employment medical examina-
tions. He has classified the purpose of such examinations as two-fold: first,
protective of the worker himself and of his colleagues similar to the ADA's
"direct-threat" defense; 68 and, second, "selective" rationale of using the exa-
mination results to void economic costs on the employer because of a job
applicant's impairment or condition. The ADA permits pre-employment
medical examinations provided they are carried out after a job offer has been
made, they are consistently required of all workers in the same job category, and
they relate to actual duties required by one in this position.69
The sense of the experts is that any permissible pre-employment medical
examinations must be limited to the first purpose and that any "selective" testing
is to be prohibited. This inquiry into the purpose is a distinction from the ADA,
provided only that the outward characteristics required by the statute are met.
V. HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT, HARASSMENT, AND DISPARATE
TREATMENT/IMPACT ENVIRONMENT
Many European Union countries have been particularly harsh on work-
place harassment. Although to date, with the exception of Sweden,7 ° legislative
64. Employment Equality Act, No. 21 § 16 (Ir.).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)(1)-(4) (2004).
66. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
67. See Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act How Much Must One Do Before Hardship becomes Undue?, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 1311, 1327 (1991).
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b)(4), 12113(b) (2004). Interestingly, in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal,
536 U.S. 73 (2002), the Supreme Court approved a regulation that extended such protection to the worker
himself, a more paternalistic stance than that reflected in the statutory language.
69. §§ 12112(d)(3)(A)-(B).
70. See, e.g., Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Sept.
3, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force September 3, 1981) (The Convention provided sweeping
protection for women, and was signed by more than 100 countries, including most EU member states).
Interestingly, the United States is not a signatory to this U.N. treaty. Id. An example of a European domestic
statute protecting women from workplace discrimination and harassment is the Employment Equality Act,
No. 21 § 15 (Ir.). Similarly, section 32 of the Employment Equality Act prohibits racial harassment. Id.
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proscriptions against such activity have been on grounds of race and sex.71
Mention should be made of an employment setting tort being increasingly
recognized by courts in Europe--"mobbing." This concept makes unlawful
workplace harassment for any reason, whether or not related to the worker's
membership in any express group. 2 The Framework Directive expressly
forbids harassment, defined as "unwanted conduct.., with the purpose or effect
of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile,
degrading, humiliating, or offensive environment.""
Several of the federal appellate courts in the United States have extended
the principle that harassment is unlawful under the ADA. For example, the
Fourth Circuit held that hostile work environment harassment claims are
actionable under the ADA in Fox v. General Motors.74 The Fifth Circuit, in
Flowers v. Southern Regional Physician Services," and the Eighth Circuit, in
Shaver v. Independent Stave Co.76 have also held such claims are actionable.
American anti-discrimination legislation does not expressly refer to
disparate impact discrimination as unlawful-i.e., an employer's actions which,
although not intended to be discriminatory, nonetheless have that effect. The
United States Supreme Court first held disparate impact discrimination to be
unlawful under Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power" and by dictum has extended
this doctrine to ADA claims. 78 European terminology for disparate treatment
and disparate impact claims are, "direct" and "indirect" discrimination respec-
tively. The Framework Directive expressly states that both are unlawful.79 Pre-
sumably, the principles of "hostile environment" and "direct versus indirect"
discrimination are examples of the EU's following the lead of American federal
law that predated the European versions.
71. Prohibition of Discrimination in Working Life of People with Disabilities Act, art. 132 (Swed.)
(Section 9 expressly prohibits harassment on the ground of disability).
72. See Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Not Just in Sicily: "Mobbing" the European Workplace Tort, 36
BUS. L. REV. 173-95 (2003).
73. See Framework Directive, supra note 2, art. 2 1 3. Cf. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB, v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
74. Fox v. General Motors Co., 247 F.3d 169, 175 (4th Cir. 2001).
75. Flowers v. Southern Regional Physicians, Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 2001).
76. Shaver v. Independent Shaver Co., 350 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 2003).
77. Griggs et al. v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
78. See Raytheon Co. v. Hemandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) (holding that the lower court wrongfully
applied disparate impact analysis to a claim, which properly should have been decided under the disparate
treatment principle.) The Court inferred that both disparate treatment and disparate impact were appropriate
in ADA claims. Id.
79. Framework Directive, supra note 2, art. 2 ga 1, 3.
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VI. ASPECTS OF THE ADA THE PANEL OF EXPERTS
APPEARS DESIROUS OF AVOIDING
While looking to the ADA as the ideal statute, those concerned with com-
pliance with the Framework Directive want to avoid any legislative language
that might be an invitation to European courts to construe the laws similar to
some United States Supreme Court decisions which would restricting the
directive's rights-conferring purpose.
One example is the Sutton triad of decisions in 1999.8o The United States
Supreme Court held that one is not a "person with a disability" under the statute
if his impairment is correctable. 8' For example, the plaintiffs in Sutton were twin
sisters whose applications for positions as pilots with defendant airline were
rejected because of their eyesight. Although they both had 20/200 vision,
prescribed eyeglasses corrected both to 20/20. This resulted in the quixotic
situation in which they proved discrimination because of an alleged disability,
but they actually were not disabled. The Court did not accept the plaintiffs'
argument that they were "perceived" as persons with a disability, which would
have qualified them under the third prong of the statute.82 Interesting, while the
Framework Directive does not expressly require protection of persons because
they have a history of a disability or are regarded by others as being disabled,
or because of their association with a person with a disability,83 experts have
determined that such protection lies within its spirit.84
Another example of a result to be avoided is that in US. Airways v.
Barnett,85 in which the United States Supreme Court decided that an accom-
modation which encroached upon another worker's seniority rights would be
unreasonable. In Europe, seniority generally is viewed as vesting one with
retirement security from the state, although some countries, such as Germany,
give longer-serving workers priority in the event layoffs are necessary. 6
80. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527
U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
81. Sutton and Murphy were decided by like votes of 7-2 because of two distinguishing facts, which
Justices Breyer and Stevens viewed as material. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 495 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Murphy, 527
U.S. at 525 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Albertson was decided unanimously because of distinguishing facts.
Albertson's, Inc., 527 U.S. at 577.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C).
83. The ADA extends protection to persons who have been subjected to discrimination because of
their association with a person with a disability. § 12112(b)(4).
84. See the rationale in Baseline Study, supra note 30, at 46.
85. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
86. German law, for example, requires that workers' seniority (in addition to age and number of
dependents) be taken into account when layoffs become necessary. For a good discussion of this principle,
see Manfred Weiss, The Role of Neutrals in the Resolution of Labor Disputes in the Federal Republic of
Germany, 10 COMP. LAB. L.J. 339, 352 (1988).
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A final United States Supreme Court opinion repugnant to the intent of the
directive is Toyota Manufacturing, Kentucky v. Williams.87 Here, the Court
limited protection to those whose impairments limit their performance of tasks
of a central importance to the daily lives of most people. The plaintiff, who
suffered from carpel tunnel syndrome, was not a person with a disability under
this principle because her condition did not preclude her from performing a
wide range of activities.
This author has observed from several legal work assignments in Germany,
Austria, Northern Ireland, and Ireland that the general European concept of what
constitutes a disability is considerably broader than the American one, whether
in anti-discrimination or social security laws.88 The legal protection for disabled
workers and/or job applicants will affect the pre-EU enlargement estimation of
some thirty-seven million persons with disabilities, 89 a figure that is presumably
considerably greater after the addition of the ten new member states.
Finally, the American company doing business in Europe should be aware
of the usual absence of a legislative requirement that coverage requires a
minimum number of employees, such as the fifteen specified in Title VII and
the ADA. Generally, in Europe an employer is required to comply with
employment legislation regardless of the size of its work force.90
VII. CONCLUSION
The integration of social policies into the European Communities
originally founded on economic principles and the EC's express adoption of the
European Convention on Human Rights place additional burdens on companies
with regard to the employer-employee relationship. The European Com-
mission's emphasis on rights for the disabled has essentially viewed the ADA
as its basic model, but the greater focus on human rights relative to American
law and the social state reality of all EU member states predictably will impose
more particularized duties on the employer in Europe.
The paternalism of the Council of Europe has become an adopted sibling
to European Union law in general and more specifically, to legal obligations to
87. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
88. See, e.g., Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Who Hold the Employment Contract 'Trump Card'?
Comparing Labor Laws in Germany and the United States for the International Investor, 4 IND. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 33 (1993), for discussion on the substantial social protections for workers in Germany, as an
example of similar legislation throughout the EU.
89. 1 EUROPEAN YEAR OF PERSONS WITH DISABLITIms (EYPD) NEWSLETTER (Summer, 2003).
90. Examples are Germany's Mutterschutzgesetz (MuSchG) [Law for the protection of working
mothers] (1968) (F.R.G.). Both Ireland's Employment Equality Act and the United Kingdom's Disability
Discrimination Act prohibit discrimination in the workplace on specified grounds, with no reference to any
minimum number of workers required for coverage. Employment Equality Act, No. 21, 1998 (Ir.); Disability
Discrimination Act, 1995, (Eng.).
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persons with disabilities. The words may be similar, indeed, often identical, to
American federal law, but the meanings to be inferred by the European
Commission and the courts is likely to have considerable more breadth.
The American company expanding into Europe must be cognizant of this
substantial human rights element in its dealings with employees. A seismic shift
can be expected in post-Framework Directive domestic law implementation
regarding the extent of protection required for the disabled in the workplace.
